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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
LAW OF THE SEA
1978-1979
This Synopsis highlights major events occurring in the law of
the sea between December 1978 and December 1979. It discusses
the eighth session of the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). It also discusses significant
events that occurred outside the UNCLOS 111i
THE EIGHTH SESSION OF THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
The seventh session of UNCLOS III ended in 1978 with im-
proved prospects for consensus. 2 It left unresolved, however, im-
portant issues with respect to seabed mining, the decision-making
process in the International Seabed Authority,3 finance and tech-
nology transfer, maritime boundary delimitation, and dispute set-
1. The primary sources used to compile this Synopsis include: United Na-
tions documents, United Nations press releases, the United Nations Chronicle, In-
ternational Legal Materials, the United States Department of State Bulletin,
Department of State internal documents, United States Code, Congressional and
Administrative News, the Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, the New York
Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, the
United States Joint Publications Research Service-Translations on Law of the
Sea, and, in lieu of the London Times (suspended because of a strike), the Daily
Telegraph.
2. For a detailed discussion of the seventh session of UNCLOS III, see
Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Seventh
Session, 73 Am. J. Fr'L L 1 (1979).
3. The Authority is the international body which will supervise the conduct
of deep seabed mining.
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tlement.4
Prior to the eighth session, an informal intersessional meeting
was held to enable delegations to consult and exchange views.5
At the meeting, representatives discussed financial arrangements
for deep seabed mining,6 continental shelf research, 7 and general
rules for delimiting continental shelves and establishing maritime
boundaries.8
Two multilateral conferences on the law of the sea also pre-
ceded the eighth session. Socialist nations met in Sofia, Bulgaria,
from February 27 to March 1, 1979, and generally discussed issues
to be covered at the eighth session.9 Twenty-three Islamic na-
tions met in Istanbul, Turkey, from March 6 to March 9, 1979.10
They discussed seabed mining, rules for continental shelf delimi-
tation, and territorial limits." Their recommendations were sub-
sequently presented to the Tenth Islamic Conference of Foreign
Ministers on Law of the Sea held in Fez, Morrocco, from May 8 to
4. For a more detailed summary of the significant issues left unresolved at
the end of the seventh session, see Richardson, Introduction, 16 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 451, 451-459 (1979).
5. Many delegations had requested that informal intersessional negotiations
be conducted between the seventh and eighth sessions of UNCLOS Ill. Letter
from President H. Shirley Amerasinghe to the Heads of Delegations Participating
in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (Jan. 13, 1979).
Some developing countries objected to the intersessional meeting because they
feared they would be prejudiced by their unavoidable absence. U.S. Dep't of
State, U.S. Delegation Report, Informal Consultations on the Law of the Sea, Ge-
neva, January 23-February 7, 1979, (Feb. 26, 1979) (unpublished memorandum).
6. Financial arrangements for deep seabed exploitation were discussed at
length. Prospective seabed mining countries stressed that the proposed high pay-
ments were likely to discourage investment in such a high-risk venture. The
United States strongly opposed the "Brazil Clause" which obligates contractors to
conduct technology transfer negotiations with the Enterprise and developing
countries. Id.
7. The United States Delegation emphasized that access to the Continental
Shelf beyond demarcation for the purpose of scientific research was very impor-
tant and did not derogate from fundamental coastal State interests. However,
other coastal States emphasized that resource-oriented research should be subject
to a consent regime. Id.
8. Discussions centered on a modification of the "Irish Formula," which al-
lows states to exploit the continental shelf to a distance determined by the
formula without restraint; profits derived from exploitation of the continental shelf
beyond that point would be subject to some form of sharing with the international
community. Id. addendum at 5.
9. Representatives from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania,
Yugoslavia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, East Germany, Cuba, Mongolia, and Viet
Nam attended. Sofia radio BTA (Bulgaria), broadcast at 1845 GMT, Mar. 1, 1979,
translated and reprinted in 93 U.S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE-
TRANSLATIONS ON LAw OF THE SEA 17 (1979).
10. Ankara Domestic Service (Turkey), broadcast at 1600 GMT, Mar. 9, 1979,
translated and reprinted in 94 U.S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE-
TRANSLATIONS ON LAw OF THE SEA 7 (1979).
11. Id.
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May 12, 1979.12 Documents from that conference circulated as offi-
cial UNCLOS documents at the second meeting of the eighth ses-
sion.13
The eighth session retained the structure of the seventh ses-
sion.14 It consisted of two meetings. Negotiations during the first
meeting centered on replacing the Informal Composite Negotiat-
ing Text (ICNT)15 with a revised edition (ICNT/R).16 Negotia-
12. The Islamic nations opposed unilateral legislation that would permit deep
seabed mining. They recommended the use of equitable principles to delimit mar-
itime boundaries. They also supported the Arab formula which limits the natural
prolongation of the continental shelf to 200 miles. U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/86 (1979).
13. Id.
14. It consisted of three committees, each covering one broad topic area. The
first two committees were further broken down into seven negotiating groups.
Each negotiating group was assigned one significant, unresolved issue within its
committee's particular topic area.
Committee I develops policy for management and control of deep seabed re-
sources in areas beyond national jurisdiction. Synopsis, Recent Developments in
the Law of the Sea, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 707 (1979). Committee W's topic area is
jurisdiction within the 200-mile exclusive economic zone, the continental shelf,
and jurisdiction on the high seas. Id. at 711. Committee I deals with marine pol-
lution and scientific research issues. Id. at 712.
The chairman of each committee works closely with the president of UNCLOS
I. The president may offer his own ideas on the provisions being negotiated;
however, each chairman is free to determine the "precise formulation" of provi-
sions to be incorporated into a new text. United Nations Third Conference on the
Law of the Sea: Explanatory Memorandum on the Informal Composite Negotiat-
ing Text, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/WP.10/Add. 1, reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERI-
ALS 1099, 1100 (1977).
Committee I consists of negotiating groups one through three. Committee II
consists of negotiating groups four through seven. Committee III was not divided
into negotiating groups because when the groups were established, Committee fI
had no unresolved hard-core issues similar to those discussed below.
The seven negotiating groups were assigned the following respective issues:
1. The system of exploitation and exploration of the deep seabed and re-
source policy.
2. Financial arrangements.
3. Organs of the Authority, their composition, powers, and functions.
4. Right of access of land-locked States and certain developing coastal
States in a subregion or region to the living resources of the exclusive
economic zone.
5. The question of the settlement of disputes relating to the exercise of
the sovereign rights of coastal States in the exclusive economic zone.
6. Definition of the outer limits of the Continental Shelf and the question
of payments and contributions with respect to the exploitation of the
continental shelf beyond 200 miles.
7. Delimitation of maritime boundaries between adjacent and opposite
States and settlement of disputes thereon.
15. The ICNT was released after the sixth session of UNCLOS lIt It contains
over 300 clauses which represent the official UNCLOS position on the issues to be
covered by the treaty. 8 UNCLOS III OR 1, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/WP.10 (1977), re-
printed in 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1108 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ICNT].
16. U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/WP.10/Rev. 1 (1979), reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL
tions at the second meeting focused on final changes to the ICNT/
R with the goal of producing a final Law of the Sea Convention by
the end of next year's session.
The Geneva Meeting, March 19-April 27, 1979
Committee I
Negotiating Group One produced ICNT revisions which would
permit the Authority to conduct deep seabed marine scientific re-
search and to enter contracts for that purpose. 7 States Parties
would have an express right to conduct similar research.18 Annex
I of the ICNT was changed to require a contractor to transfer
technology to the Enterprise' 9 only when similar technology was
not available on the open market.20 The group revised Annex H
to grant prospectors the right to remove a reasonable amount of
samples from the deep seabed.21 Annex II was also changed to
establish more objective criteria for the selection of contract ap-
plicants. The new criteria are the applicant's financial and techni-
cal competence and past performance history.
22
Negotiating Group Two produced new texts which would re-
quire a seabed mining state to provide half of the Enterprise's
capital in any joint venture.23 However, the group reached an im-
passe on an important issue-the financing systems available to
prospective contractors. 24 The United States and other developed
countries stressed that existing fixed-fee systems would discour-
MIATERiALS 686 (1979) [hereinafter cited as ICNT/R].
17. Id., art. 143, para. 2. Compare id. with ICNT, supra note 15, art. 143.
18. ICNT/R, supra note 16, art. 143, para. 3. Compare id. with ICNT, supra
note 15, art. 143. The ICNT stated only that States Parties should promote or coop-
erate in the conduct of marine scientific research. The revision makes it clear that
States Parties have a right to conduct such research.
19. The Enterprise is the organ of the Authority that will conduct deep seabed
mining.
20. ICNT/R, supra note 16, Annex II, art. 5, para. 1(6). Compare id. with
ICNT, supra note 15, Annex H, para. 8.
One ingredient essential to making the Enterprise a viable entity is its access to
the equipment and know-how needed for seabed mining. The ICNT/R meets this
need by requiring a contract applicant to transfer the requisite technology to the
Enterprise.
21. ICNT/R, supra note 16, Annex II art. 2, para. 2. Compare id. with ICNT,
supra note 15, Annex II, para. 2(6).
22. ICNT/R, supra note 16, Annex II, art. 7, para. 2(a).
23. The previous capitalization was one-third cash (paid by the applicant) and
two-thirds debt (loans from States Parties). Developing countries felt that this
was insufficient start-up capital for a new mining project. The major developed
countries argued that one-third cash funding was normal commercial practice.
U.N. Dep't of Pub. Information, Press Release SEA/360, at 7 (Apr. 30, 1979) [here-
inafter cited as SEA/360].
24. The ICNT set out a complex fixed-fee system of charges that the Authority
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age investors; they urged a financial system that tied contractors'
charges to the profitability of their operations. 25 The Group of 77
(G-77)26 nations opposed changing the basic concept behind the
fixed-fee systems; they feared that absent a fixed fee system, the
Enterprise would never become a viable entity because of thin
capitalization and inadequate financing.27 The G-77 nations did
could levy on a contractor. This portion of the ICNT was a preliminary draft.
ICNT, supra note 15, Annex II, para. 7.
The chairman of Negotiating Group Two proposed two alternate systems for
contractors to choose from in paying their charges to the Authority. The two
finance systems are a mixed system of royalty plus profit-sharing, and a royalty-
only system. The mixed system consists of:
(1) a $500,000 application fee, with portions not used by the Authority re-
fundable to the applicant;
(2) an annual fixed fee of $1 million to be credited against royalty pay-
ments once production begins;
(3) a production charge (royalty) on the gross proceeds of the integrated
project of 2% for the first 6 years, 4% for years 7-12, and 6% for years
13-20;
(4) a share of the net proceeds attributable to the mining sector;
(5) attributable net proceeds (ANP) at 40% of the total net proceeds of
the integrated project; and
(6) a safeguard clause which would hold a contractor at the first level of
profit-sharing until he recoups his initial investment costs and at the
second level until he recoups double his investment costs.
The royalty-only system also contains a $500,000 application fee and an annual
fixed fee of $1 million. The royalty on gross proceeds is 7.5% for years 1-6, 10% for
years 7-12, and 14% for years 13-20. U.S. Delegation Report, Eighth Session of the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Geneva, March 19-April
27, 1979, at 17-18 (unpublished report) (on file with the San Diego Law Review)
[hereinafter cited as U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva].
25. The United States representatives stated that the chairman's proposal was
unrealistic, placed a heavy burden on seabed miners, and that any charges should
be tied to the profitability of the operations. The United States, supported by
other developed nations, proposed a change in the mixed financial system. The
proposal decreased by half the charges levied on the contractors by the Authority.
Id.
26. The Group of 77 is a bloc of nations composed of approximately 110 under-
developed countries. Their concerns within UNCLOS III usually run counter to
the views of the highly industrialized nations. For a discussion of the Group's role
in UNCLOS III, see Friedman and Williams, The Group of 77 at the United Nations:
An Emergent Force in the Law of the Sea, 16 SAN DIEGO L REV. 584 (1979). For
additional background discussion of the politics of the developing nations, con-
cerning distribution of seabed wealth, see Borgese, The New Economic Order and
the Law of the Seas, 14 SAN DIEGO L REV. 584 (1977), and Borgese, A Constitution
for the Oceans: Comments and Suggestions Regarding Part XI of the Informal
Composite Negotiating Text, 15 SAx DiEGO I- REv. 371 (1978).
27. The G-77 did not believe the proposed systems, supra note 24, would pro-
vide the Authority with sufficient revenue. The group initially proposed that con-
tractors pay the Authority $60 million for each mine site. Additionally, the group
later proposed a supertax on contractors who earned high profits. SEA/360, supra
note 23, at 7.
make concessions to the developed countries by decreasing con-
tractor payments in the existing finance systems. 28
Negotiating Group Three failed to resolve the dispute over the
voting mechanism in the Council.29 The developed countries,
which represent a minority on the Council, wanted sufficient vot-
ing power to protect their potentially large investments in seabed
mining.3 0 The group did change the eligibility criteria for selec-
tion of seabed miner and consumer/importer members to the
Council.31 The change insured that members from the two cate-
gories would be selected from the States having the most signifi-
cant interests in those categories.32 Article 169 of the ICNT was
28. The G-77 nations changed the royalty rates in the mixed system, supra
note 24, to 2% in years 1-10, and 5% in years 11-20. To keep the rates in the roy-
alty-only system equivalent, G-77 nations adjusted the rates to 8.5% in years 1-10,
and 13.5% in years 11-20. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, supra note 24, at 19.
There were other changes in the financial arrangements. The Authority was al-
lowed to offer incentives to contractors to train the Authority's personnel. Once
commercial production commences, miners must pay the greater of the annual
fixed fee or the production charge. The Authority may revoke the contractor's
choice under the mixed system of financial arrangements. Id. at 20.
29. The Council is the executive organ of the Authority. A detailed listing of
its powers and functions can be found at ICNT/R, supra note 16, art. 162.
30. Developing nations expressed their unwillingness to allow nations with
special interests veto power or voting power that could not be overridden by the
majority. United States Ambassador Richardson made an intervention on January
31, 1979, stating United States insistence that a numerical majority not be empow-
ered to override the legitimate economic interests of major producers and consum-
ers of metals mined from the seabed, as follows:
The seabed mining companies cannot reasonably be asked to repose
blind trust in a majority whose interest-whose responsibilities, indeed-
are not the same as their own . . . [PIroducers and consumers are not
seeking to be granted power proportionate to their economic interests but
only to be protected against the possibility that a majority might override
those interests.
Statement by Ambassador Elliot L. Richardson during Discussion of a Matter
Within the Competence of Negotiating Group 3, Geneva, (Jan. 31, 1979) reprinted
in U.S. Dep't State, U.S. Delegation Report, UNCLOS Intersessional Meeting, Ge-
neva, January 23-February 7, 1979 (attachment to memorandum).
Under both the ICNT and the ICNT/R, each Council member has one vote. De-
cisions on questions of substance require a three-fourths majority of members
present and voting. ICNT, supra note 15, art. 159, paras. 6-7; ICNT/R, supra note
16, art. 161, paras. 6-7.
31. The Council consists of 36 members selected from four categories of States
Parties: four from States having large investments in seabed mining; four from
mineral consuming/importing States; four from States with significant land-based
mineral production; and six from developing countries. The remaining eighteen
are selected to ensure equitable geographic distribution. ICNT/R, supra note 16,
art. 161, para. 1.
32. Id. para. l(a)-l(b). Compare id. with ICNT, supra note 15, art. 159, para.
1(a)-1(b).
The new definitions set a limit on the number of States from which the repre-
sentatives in each category will be selected. The new definitions also assure that
those States which in fact have the most significant interests in the two categories
will comprise the group from which the representatives will be selected. Election
to category (a), seabed miners, will be from among the eight States that have the
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changed to permit the Enterprise to transport, process and mar-
ket seabed nodules. 33 The group also made changes that gave the
Council more power to control mining operations that threaten
environmental harm.
34
The Group of Legal Experts on Seabed Disputes35 revised the
ICNT to require the Authority to take action against Authority
staff members who have a wrongful financial interest in seabed
mining or who wrongfully disclose proprietary information.36 Ar-
ticle 187 was changed to focus the jurisdiction of the Seabed Dis-
putes Chamber on subject matter rather than parties. 37 The
group also changed ICNT article 188 to permit States Parties to
submit seabed disputes to an ad hoc chamber of the Seabed Dis-
putes Chamber.3
8
The Working Group of Twenty-one discussed all of the issues
within Committee I's purview.39 Many of its suggestions with re-
largest investments in seabed mining. Election to category (b), consumers/im-
porters, will be from among the ten or eleven states that are the largest consumers
or net importers of the categories of minerals from the area.
33. ICNT/R, supra note 16, art. 170, para. 1. Compare id. with ICNT, supra
note 15, art. 169, para. 1.
The change was made to reflect the generally accepted view that the Enterprise
be permitted to engage in transportation, processing, and marketing of nodules as
well as their recovery. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, supra note 24, at 24.
34. The amendments permitted the Council to require "adjustments" in min-
ing operations to prevent serious harm to the environment. The Council can also
disapprove areas for exploitation in order to prevent "serious harm to the marine
environment." The previous phrasing allowed Council disapproval only to prevent
"irreparable harm to a unique environment." U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva,
supra note 24, at 25. But see ICNT/R, supra note 16, art. 162, para. 2.
35. At the first meeting, Committee rs chairman supplemented his three nego-
tiating groups with a group of legal experts and a group of technical experts. The
group of legal experts discussed commercial arbitration and other methods of
resolving possible deep seabed disputes. The group of technical experts discussed
deep seabed production limitations. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, supra note
24, at 7.
36. ICNT/R, supra note 16, art. 168, para. 3. Compare id. with ICNT, supra
note 15, art. 167.
37. ICNT/R, supra note 16, art. 187. Compare id. with ICNT, supra note 15,
art. 187.
The Chamber's jurisdiction extends to matters relating to activities in the deep
seabed, including States' disputes over interpretation and application of the Con-
vention. The chamber can also entertain contractual disputes, including a refusal
by the Authority to grant a contract. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, supra note
24, at 26.
38. ICNT/R, supra note 16, art. 188, para. 1. The ICNT required the dispute to
be submitted to arbitration. ICNT, supra note 15, art. 188.
39. At the start of the first meeting, the committee chairman created a new ne-
gotiating group, the Working Group of Twenty-one. The group was formed at the
gard to financial arrangements were incorporated into the new
texts produced by Negotiating Group Two.40 The group changed
the Authority's role from coordinating research to coordinating
the dissemination of its results.
41
Committee II
Negotiating Group Four discussed access of landlocked and ge-
ographically disadvantaged States (LL/GDS) to coastal State
fisheries.42 Coastal States objected to LL/GDS fishery access be-
ing termed a right.43 The LL/GDS countries objected to their
fishery access rights being limited to fish that were surplus to a
coastal State's catch capacity.44 The group agreed to incorporate
into the ICNT/R the text produced at the seventh session.45 That
text requires a coastal State that is capable of harvesting all of its
allowable catch to make equitable arrangements with LL/GDS
countries to allow their continued fishing.46
Negotiating Group Five met only once during the first meeting,
decided not to reopen negotiations, and incorporated its seventh
session revisions into the ICNT/R.47 Those revisions excepted
from binding arbitration or adjudication disputes over a coastal
State's sovereign right to control fishing in its exclusive economic
request of G-77 nations. It permitted Committee I issues to be discussed in a
smaller forum. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, supra note 24, at 7.
40. See note 24 supra.
41. ICNT/R, supra note 16, art. 143.
42. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, supra note 24, at 29. For a background
discussion on the politics of the LL/GDS, concerning distribution of Seabed
wealth, see Borgese, The New Economic Order and the Law of the Sea, 14 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 584 (1977).
For an analysis of the impact of the UNCLOS on Coastal States as opposed to
LL/GDS, see D. JOHNSTON, MARINE Poucy AND THE COASTAL CoMmuNTrY (1976).
43. D. JOHNSTON, supra note 42. The ICNT gave the LL/GDS the right to equi-
table participation in the exploitation of living resources in adjoining States' exclu-
sive economic zones. ICNT, supra note 15, art. 69, para. 1; SEA/360, supra note 23,
at 11.
44. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, supra note 23, at 29. The ICNT allowed a
coastal State to determine the allowable catch of.the living resources in its exclu-
sive economic zone. ICNT, supra note 15, art. 61, para. 1.
The coastal State was also allowed to determine its capacity to harvest the re-
sources. Where the allowable catch exceeded the coastal State's catch capacity,
the coastal State was required to give other States access to surplus. Id., art. 62,
para. 1.
One possible problem with the ICNT provision is that coastal States could le-
gally deny access by either inflating their catch capacity or deflating their catch
quotas so as to eliminate any surplus.
45. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, supra note 24, at 29.
46. Id. The ICNT/R retains the ICNT clauses in note 44 supra. However, a
new clause gives the LL/GDS a right to fisheries access even if the coastal State is
capable of harvesting its entire allowable catch. ICNT/R, supra note 16, art. 69,
para. 3. Compare id. with ICNT, supra note 15, art. 69.
47. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, supra note 24, at 30.
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zone.48
Negotiating Group Six modified the definition of the continental
shelf.49 The ICNT had defined the continental shelf as extending
200 miles from baselines used to measure the territorial sea;
48. ICNT/R, supra note 16, art 296, para. 3(a).
49. The group discussed three proposed definitions of the outer limit of the
continental shelf. The first proposal, the "Irish Formula," fixed the limit either by
using a sediment-thickness test, or by measuring a fixed distance from the foot of
the continental shelf. The second proposal fixed the continental shelf limit at the
limit of the 200-mile exclusive economic zone. The third proposal, offered by the
Soviet Union, was a variation of the Irish formula and placed a fixed limit on the
extent of continental shelf a state could claim. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva,
supra note 24, at 31.
Briefly, the arguments made by proponents of the Soviet formula (and against
the Irish formula) are that it is easier to apply, provides more certainty as to the
ultimate result, reduces the possibility of dispute, obviates the need for an inter-
national commission to review the claims of coastal States, and involves less en-
croachment on the international area. These arguments appear to be directed to
the proposal for a maximum distance limit and not to the problem of ascertaining
the limit of the continental margin within that maximum limit.
The arguments made against the Soviet proposal (and in favor of the Irish
formula) are that it ignores the geological basis of the continental shelf doctrine,
eliminates existing rights of the coastal State over the entire "natural prolonga-
tion" of its land territory under the sea, fails to take into account the economic and
environmental interests of the coastal State in hydrocarbon production off its
coast, and might unnecessarily complicate the division of common fluid resource
deposits. In addition, one might note that this proposal could further complicate
the deep seabed negotiations by extending their scope beyond manganese nodules
to hydrocarbon deposits; it might encroach upon more of the "common heritage"*
than the Irish formula unless something like the Irish formula is itself used to de-
fine the continental margin within the 350-mile limit; and it might stimulate de-
mands for a universal 350-mile zone, irrespective of geology, on the seabeds or in
the water column as well, resulting in vast new encroachments on the interna-
tional area and the high seas and the possible elimination of revenue sharing from
any expanded universal zone measured by distance. Oxman, The Third Confer-
ence on Law of the Seas: The Seventh Session (1978), 73 AM. J. INT'L L 1, 21 (1979).
(350-mile substituted for 300-mile to avoid confusion.)
* Dr. Arvid Pardo, Ambassador to the United Nations from Malta, in his ad-
dress delivered before the United Nations General Assembly on August 17, 1967,
brought the "common heritage" concept to the forefront of international politics.
At this time Dr. Pardo expressed great concern over the possibility of "a competi-
tive scramble for sovereign rights over the land underlying the world's seas and
oceans." Dr. Pardo feared that this "scramble" for national appropriation of the
international seabed would:
(1) result in an inequitable allocation of food, fuel and mineral re-
sources;
(2) have a negative impact on land-based mineral resources;
(3) include the increased use of the seabed and ocean floor for military
purposes; and
(4) result in increased pollution of the marine environment.
During this same speech, Dr. Pardo called for United Nations preparation of a
declaration and treaty that would
where the continental margin extended beyond 200 miles, a State
could extend its continental shelf to the edge of the margin.50 The
modification contains three formulae which a State must use to
limit the extent of continental shelf it claims beyond 200 miles.51
Another revision by the group increased the developing countries'
share of coastal States' shelf production beyond 200 miles.52
Negotiating Group Seven met several times to discuss rules and
criteria for delimiting maritime boundaries.5 3 A deadlock arose
between those favoring equitable rules for delimitation and those
favoring a median-line rule.54 As a result, the ICNT articles on
maritime boundary delimitation remained unchanged.SS The
group rejected a moratorium proposal that would have enjoined
any State from taking action that would aggravate or affect a
boundary dispute.5 6
Committee 1mT
As a result of negotiations during the seventh session and the
first meeting of the eighth session, two of the three issues within
the mandate of Committee Ill are now closed. The closed issues
are protection of the marine environment 7 and transfer of marine
(1) reserve the seabed and ocean floor as the common heritage of man-
kind;
(2) establish a system in which all countries would benefit from those re-
sources on and under the ocean floor; and
(3) arrange for the control and administration of exploration and ex-
ploitation of deep seabed minerals by an international agency.
50. ICNT, supra note 15, art. 76.
51. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, supra note 24, at 23. The three formulae
are at ICNT/R, supra note 16, art. 76, para. 4.
For a discussion of different ways to measure continental margins, see Hedberg,
Relations of Political Boundaries on the Ocean Floor to the Continental Margin, 17
VA. J. IN'L L. 57 (1976).
52. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, supra note 24, at 31. The ICNT set the
contribution at a rate of one percent beginning six years after the treaty. The con-
tribution to developing countries would be increased by one percent each year un-
til five percent was reached. ICNT, supra note 15, art. 82.
The revision increased the maximum contribution to seven percent. ICNT/R,
supra note 16, art. 82.
53. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, supra note 24, at 33.
54. Id.; SEA/360, supra note 23, at 16.
The ICNT stated that delimitation "shall be effected by agreement in accordance
with equitable principles, employing, where appropriate, the median and equidis-
tance line, and taking account of all the relevant circumstances." ICNT, supra
note 15, art. 83, para. 1, & art. 74, para. 1.
For an explanation and a practical application of equitable and geological factors
in delimitation of the continental shell; see Brown, The Anglo-French Continental
Shelf Case, 16 SAN DzEGo L. REV. 461 (1979).
55. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, supra note 24, at 34.
56. Id.
57. ICNT/R, supra note 16, arts. 192-237.
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technology.58 The issue of marine scientific research still requires
negotiation.
The Committee's discussions on marine scientific research were
not very productive. 59 The United States contended that existing
ICNT provisions unnecessarily restricted freedom to conduct re-
search on the continental shelf and proposed three amendments
that would lessen research restrictions.6 0 States having broad
margins opposed the amendments. 6 1 The Soviet Union proposed
that researchers conducting research related to continental shelf
exploitation must obtain permission from the coastal State.62 The
United States opposed the proposal as being too burdensome.
63
Some broad-margin States also opposed the proposal, claiming it
provided insufficient protection to the coastal States.64 The Com-
mittee did amend ICNT article 276 to promote the creation of na-
tional marine scientific and technological research centers in
developing coastal States.
65
The New York Meeting, July 19-August 24, 1979
At the New York meeting, the Conference set a deadline of Au-
gust 1980 for adopting a Law of the Sea Convention.66 It also pro-
duced a detailed plan to meet the deadline. 67 The plan permits
58. Id. arts. 266-78.
59. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, supra note 24, at 38. The chairman of
Committee III reported that his committee had devoted a substantial part of its
time to research issues, but that the discussions "could not be considered as con-
clusive." SEA/360, supra note 25, at 19.
60. The United States proposed three amendments which would provide more
freedom to conduct research. "The [amendments] were not made public; how-
ever, the proposals which the United States made on this topic last year were
aimed at facilitating the conduct of research by foreign ships in the economic
zones and on the continental shelves of coastal states." SEA/360, upra note 23, at
19.
For a detailed discussion of the proposed United States position on each ICNT/
R article covering research, see Memorandum from Norman Wulf, United States
Representative, Committee III, to the Members of the Marine Science Subcommit-
tee of the Law of the Sea Advisory Committee (June 29, 1979).
61. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, supra note 24, at 38.
62. Id. at 39.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. ICNT/R, supra note 16, art. 276. Compare id. with ICNT, supra note 15,
art. 276.
66. U.N. Dep't of Pub. Information, Press Release SEA/375, at 2 (Aug. 24, 1979)
[hereinafter cited as SEA/375].
67. Report of the General Committee, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/88 (1979); Note By
the President For the Meeting of the General Committee Fixed for Wednesday, 22
the Convention to be completed after ten weeks of meetings in
1980.68 During the first three weeks, the negotiating groups in
each committee will search for compromise on outstanding is-
sues. A week of plenary meetings will follow. During the plenary
meetings, delegations will record their positions on the negotiat-
ing text and any proposed revisions to it. Next, the revised text
will be changed to a draft convention, which will be submitted to
appropriate committees for possible amendment. The session
will then recess to enable governments to study the final draft
convention.
When the session resumes work, each committee will pursue
general agreement on any issues remaining. Any new amend-
ments will have to be submitted on the first day of the resumed
session. The Conference will also consider any additional proce-
dures necessary to produce a Convention by the fifth week of the
resumed session.69
August 1979, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/BUR/12 (1979). See also SEA/375, supra note
66, at 1.
68. U.N. Doc. A/Conf.BUR/12 at 3 (1979); U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/88 at 3 (1979).
69. The summary of the timetable was condensed from the following:
First stage
During the first three weeks of the ninth session the work on the Final
Clauses should be completed in the Informal Plenary with the assistance
of the Group of Legal Experts on the Final Clauses. This is imperative if
the final draft of the Convention is to be ready at the appropriate time.
During the same period of three weeks, the Chairmen of the three Main
Committees, assisted by the Chairmen of the established Negotiating
Groups and the Group of Legal Experts on Part XI Dispute Settle-
ment, should conduct the necessary consultations within their respective
spheres of competence in order, to the extent possible, to reach compro-
mise solutions on outstanding issues. If these consultations are to be gen-
uinely productive they must involve all delegations.
The Drafting Committee should, during the same period, meet infor-
mally to complete its work on informal recommendations that would have
to be taken into account in the preparation of the final version of the
ICNT.
Should an informal intersessional meeting of the Drafting Committee
between the eighth and ninth sessions be considered necessary to expe-
dite the preparation of the final version of the ICNT, arrangements and fa-
cilities for this purpose would have to be considered.
Second stage
At the beginning of the fourth week, there should be a formal discussion
in Plenary. Such a formal discussion would be necessary to meet the
wishes of a very large number of delegations that consider an opportunity
should be given to them before the preparation and the adoption of the
revised ICNT as a final draft convention, to place on record their position,
both in regard to proposed revisions and on the entire package. It is im-
plicit in paragraphs 10 and 11 of A/CONF/62/62 that the Plenary should
have an opportunity of discussing the proposed changes in the ICNT
before revision is effected, to enable the collegium as required by A/
CONF/62/62 to prepare the revisions. This is of special importance on the
occasion of the second revision as it is to serve, with such changes as are
negotiated, as a final draft convention through a decision of the Confer-
ence. Every delegation must be entitled to participate in the formal de-
bate but, if the debate is to be concluded within a reasonable period of
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Committee I
The Working Group of Twenty-one discussed unresolved deep
time and thus allow for the conclusion of the work of the Conference by
the end of the ninth session, the Conference would be well advised to set
a time-limit, of perhaps 15 minutes for every speaker, on the understand-
ing that delegations would, if they so wish, be permitted to present writ-
ten statements whose contents will appear as part of the official records of
the Conference, without forfeiting the right to make oral statements as
well and which will form part of the summary records.
It is estimated that should 130 delegations participate in this debate, and
given the acceptance of the proposed time-limit for each speaker, about 12
Plenary meetings of three hours each, with night meetings, would be nec-
essary and the debate could be concluded in one week.
At the end of this period, the President and the Chairmen of the Main
Committees, with whom the Chairman of the Drafting Committee and the
Rapporteur-General will be associated, will revise the ICNT, in accordance
with the procedure prescribed in paragraphs 10 and 11 of A/CONF/62/62.
Third stage
In the middle of the fifth week, the Plenary should meet to decide on
altering the status of the revised ICNT to that of a final Conference docu-
ment that would serve as a draft convention. It is recommended that in
making this decision the Conference also decide that all formal proposals
which have previously been presented be treated as having lapsed, with-
out prejudice to the right of any State participant to move a fresh amend-
ment similar to or different in substance from the one that has lapsed,
when the draft text has been given the status of a formal draft convention.
Such a procedure would be perfectly logical, as the entire procedure of
preparation of the ICNT and of the second revision was designed to con-
sider and dispose of the substance of such earlier proposals.
After the decision is taken to give the revised ICNT the status of a for-
mal conference document, the Conference will have to decide the ques-
tion of referring it for examination to the three Main Committees and the
Plenary, operating as a Main Committee, in the following manner.
Part XI and annexes H and III to the First Committee;
Parts I and X and annex I, as well as any additional annex that is found
necessary, to the Second Committee;
Parts XII, XIII and XIV to the Third Committee;
Parts XV and XVI and annexes IV, V, VI and VII to the Plenary, operat-
ing as a Main Committee.
Any delegation that wishes to submit formal amendments should en-
deavor to do so before the suspension of the session.
At this point, the session should be suspended to enable Governments
to study the final draft convention and any amendments submitted.
Final stage
During the first 10 calendar days of the resumed session the Main Com-
mittees should examine the draft convention. Any amendments not previ-
ously submitted would have to be submitted formally on the first day of
this period. During that period of 10 calendar days the Chairmen, with the
assistance as appropriate of the officers of their Committees, would have
to pursue their efforts to facilitate the attainment of general agreement,
having regard to the progress made on all matters of substance which are
closely related to one another.
By the end of this period a decision on all pending amendments will be
taken by the Committees.
The subsequent steps which would be taken during the resumed ses-
seabed issues.7 0 Although the group did not revise the ICNT/R, it
did produce new texts which offer an improved basis for future
negotiations. 71 The texts contain numerous proposed changes to
ICNT/R, Annex II.
The group made it clear that title to minerals passes upon their
recovery in accordance with the terms of the Convention.V2 In an-
other text, the group removed the Authority's power to close ar-
eas of the seabed to prospectors 73 and deleted the prospectors'
obligation to train Authority personnel. 74 A proposed change to
Annex II, article 4, requires contract applicants to be sponsored
by a State. The sponsoring State must ensure that its contractor
meets its obligations to the Authority.75 The group limited the
sion could be determined by the Conference on the recommendations of
the General Committee on the first day of the resumed session, so that
the Convention can be adopted before the end of the fifth week of the re-
sumed session having due regard to the rules of procedure and to the
Gentleman's Agreement appearing as an appendix to the rules of proce-
dure.*
Report of the General Committee, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/88 at 3 (1979). For a prior
formulation, see U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/BUR/12 at 3 (1979). See SEA/375, supra
note 66, at 2.
* The Gentleman's Agreement, approved by the U.N. General Assembly
when it convened the Conference, and endorsed by the Conference when it
adopted the Rules of Procedure, provides that the "Conference should make every
effort to reach agreement on substantive matters until all efforts at consensus
have been exhausted." Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Rules of
Procedure, Appendix, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/30/Rev. 2 (1976).
70. Negotiating groups one, two and three did not meet during the second
meeting. U.S. Delegation Report, Resumed Eighth Session of the Third United Na-
tions Conference on the Law of the Sea, New York, July 16-August 24, 1979, at 9
(unpublished report) (on file with the San Diego Law Review) [hereinafter cited
as U.S. Delegation Report, New York].
71. Id.
72. Id. Compare id. with ICNT/R, supra note 16, Annex II, art. 1. The ICNT/R
states that "title to the minerals shall be passed upon recovery of the minerals
pursuant to a contract of exploration and exploitation." Id. (emphasis added).
The new revision does not differentiate between contractors and other entities
which will recover minerals but not pursuant to a contract (ie., prospectors and
the Enterprise).
73. U.S. Delegation Report, New York, supra note 70, at 11. The ICNT/R had
given the Authority the power to close an area to prospecting when there was a
"risk of irreparable harm to a unique environment or unjustifiable interference
with other uses of the [deep seabed]." ICNT/R, supra note 16, Annex H, art. 2,
para. 1(d).
74. U.S. Delegation Report, New York supra note 70, at 11. The ICNT/R had
required States Parties to develop programs to train the Authority's personnel in
the techniques and applications of research. ICNT/R, supra note 16, art. 143, para.
3 (b) (i).
75. U.S. Delegation Report, New York, supra note 70, at 11. The amendment
also provided that sponsorship by the State of which the applicant was a national
would be sufficient. However, if an applicant possessed more than one nationality,
or was effectively controlled by another State or its nationals, then the other
States would also have to become sponsors. The need for this amendment was
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mining site data that a contract applicant must supply the Au-
thority.76 The applicant must give the Authority all of the data it
possesses; however, the Authority can no longer require the ap-
plicant to supply more data. Instead, the Authority must obtain
any additional data that it needs from an independent expert.
77
Annex II, article 13, was amended to prohibit the Authority and
the Enterprise from disclosing proprietary data to each other or
to third parties.
78
Two new texts covered financing systems. One text proposes
financing the Enterprise with loans, half interest-free and half in-
terest-bearing.7 9 The scale used for current United Nations con-
tributions would determine the loan amount required from each
questioned. SEA/375, supra note 66, at 7. Compare id. with ICNT/R, Annex IL
art. 4.
76. Under the existing parallel system of exploitation, a prospective miner
would explore likely sites, and select an area large enough for two mining opera-
tions having estimated equal commercial value. He would provide all the data he
possessed on the area to the Authority. The Authority would use the data to se-
lect one site for itself and leave the other to the applicant. SEA/375, supra note 66,
at 7. See ICNT/R, supra note 16, Annex I, art. 8.
77. The new provision also gives the Authority power to defer action on a con-
tract application for forty-five days while an independent expert assesses the data
given the Authority. The expert will determine whether the data is sufficient to
make a decision and whether the applicant is withholding data. U.S. Delegation
Report, New York, supra note 70, at 12. Compare id. with ICNT/R, supra note 16,
Annex H1, art. 8.
78. U.S. Delegation Report, New York, supra note 70, at 13. Compare id. with
ICNT/R, supra note 16, Annex H, art. 13.
79. U.S. Delegation Report, New York, supra note 70, at 22. The Chairman of
Negotiating Group Two set out the following salient features of his proposal:
(1) The Enterprise would be assured.of the funds needed to carry out
a fully integrated mining project, from exploration through marketing of
minerals. The proposal does not specify the amount of funds required, be-
cause the developing countries objected to including a figure in the con-
vention on the ground that cost estimates vary greatly-from $560 million
to $1,000 million or more. The amount would be left for decision by the
Assembly of the Authority, on the recommendation of the Council and the
advice of the Enterprise's Governing Board.
(2) The initial project would be financed by loans, half interest-free
and half interest-bearing. This is the ratio preferred by the developing
countries, whereas the industrialized countries wanted one-third to be in-
terest-free and two-thirds interest-bearing. As the Enterprise would be "a
new institution with no track record," the Chairman thought a 1:1 ratio
justifiable.
(3) The scale used for contributions to the United Nations regular
budget would be the basis for determining how much each State Party to
the convention would lend to the Enterprise. The report says that several
representatives from developing countries pointed out that no State Party
should be exempted from contributing to the Enterprise, that contribu-
country.80 An alternative proposal ties loan amounts to the
amount of benefits a nation receives from marine mining.81
The second text modified the mixed system 82 on contractor
charges by: (1) lowering production charges;83 (2) adding a safe-
guard feature that reduces a contractor's production charge when
his return on investment drops below fifteen percent per year;84
and (3) establishing a flexible tax system which permits the Au-
thority to derive its greatest revenue when the contractor's return
is high.85 The group also produced a new text which would give a
minority on the Council the voting power to block decisions on
certain sensitive issues.8 6
The Group of Legal Experts developed a consensus text which
permits the Law of the Sea Tribunal to select from its member-
tions should reflect the varying capacities of States and that the United
Nations scale was the most widely acceptable one for this purpose.
(4) Repayment of interest-bearing loans should have priority over re-
payment of interest-free loans.
SEA/375, supra note 66, at 8.
80. Id. The G-77, supported by China and the Eastern European countries, ar-
gued that "seabed mining countries should bear the entire burden of financing the
Enterprise, rather than basing assessments on the U.N. scale, since the seabed
mining countries would, in their view, receive the bulk of the benefits from min-
ing." U.S. Delegation Report, New York, supra note 70, at 23.
81. Id.
82. The "mixed system" is discussed at note 24 supra.
83. Higher production charges were proposed in previous schemes. The pro-
posed new rates are two to four percent of the value of minerals produced instead
of the earlier range of two to five percent. SEA/375, supra note 66, at 9.
84. A safeguard for the contractor would lower the four percent charge to two
percent when his return on investment was less than fifteen percent a year. Id. at
9.
85. The tax rate would vary in three increments, rising from 35-40 percent of
net proceeds to 50-70 percent. This and other provisions are calculated to avoid
making seabed mining an artificially attractive investment, thereby prejudicing
land-based mining. Id. at 10.
86. The revised text provided a voting formula that would allow a minority of
members to block decisions on "particularly sensitive" issues. Substantive ques-
tions involving nonsensitive issues would require a two-thirds vote. The sensitive
issues would require a two-thirds vote, "provided that - [a number has not been
agreed upon] members have not cast negative votes." Proposals on the number of
members required for blocking ranged from five to ten. Id.
The developing countries made their approval of the blocking formula contin-
gent upon a change to ICNT/R, article 162. That article gives automatic Council
approval to applicant work plans sixty days after their submission to the Techni-
cal Commission, if the Council has not disapproved the plan.* The proposed
change requires the Council to act upon an application within sixty days of its
submission. U.S. Delegation Report, New York, supra note 70, at 26. See also
ICNT/R, supra note 16, art. 162, para. 2(j).
* The Legal and Technical Commission is the organ of the Council that re-
views an applicant's work plans and makes recommendations to the Council.
ICNT/R, supra note 16, art. 165, para. 2.
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ship the members of the Seabed Disputes Chamber.87 The group
eliminated mandatory intervention in a dispute by a State Party
when one of its nationals brings action against another State
Party and the respondent requests such intervention.88 The
group also agreed to review a number of unresolved issues at the
next session. The issues involve resolution of disputes between
the Authority and the Enterprise and disputes between two sepa-
rate contractors.8 9
Committee II
Committee 11 met only informally during the second meeting.90
Negotiating Group Seven met, but made little progress in estab-
lishing rules for delimiting maritime boundaries. 9' The group
failed to break the deadlock between those favoring the use of eq-
uitable principles to establish maritime boundaries and those
favoring a median-line rule.9 2 The Group of Thirty-eight dis-
cussed limitations on a State's extension of its continental shelf
along oceanic ridges.93 The group failed to reach agreement; how-
87. SEA/375, supra note 66, at 11. Compare id. with ICNT/R, supra note 16,
Annex V, art. 36, para. 1. The ICNT/R gives the Assembly the power to select the
members of the Seabed Disputes Chamber.
The change was a compromise between the developing countries, who wanted
selection by the Assembly, and developed countries, who wanted selection by the
Council. U.S. Delegation Report, New York, supra note 70, at 27.
88. U.S. Delegation Report, New York, supra note 70, at 29. Compare id. with
ICNT/R, supra note 16, art 191.
89. U.S. Delegation Report, New York, supra note 70, at 30.
90. Negotiating groups four and five did not meet. Negotiating Group Six met
in a smaller forum, called the Group of Thirty-eight, and discussed continental
shelf issues. SEA/375, supra note 66, at 4. At the beginning of the second meet-
ing, the Group of Thirty-eight was established to permit continental shelf issues to
be discussed in a smaller forum. Id. at 12.
91. U.S. Delegation Report, New York, supra note 70, at 37.
92. SEA/375, supra note 66, at 13. See also U.S. Delegation Report, New York,
supra note 70, at 35.
For an in-depth discussion of the application of both approaches to a particular
dispute, see Brown, The Anglo-French Continental Shelf Case, 16 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 461 (1979).
93. The proposals on delimitation of Submarine Oceanic Ridges were summa-
rized by the United Nations Department of Public Information as follows:
The Chairman's formula would give States two criteria to choose from
in defining the outer limit of their shelf-one based on a distance (350
nautical miles from the coastal baselines) and the other on a combination
of distance and depth (no more than 100 nautical miles from the 2,500 me-
tre isobath).
Several proposals were put forward to limit the extension of the conti-
nental shelf in areas where there are submarine oceanic ridges. The So-
viet Union proposed that only the 350-mile criterion should apply in such
ever, a Japanese proposal to limit such extensions to 200 miles re-




Although Committee Ill did not change the ICNT/R, it did pro-
duce new negotiating texts which incorporated proposed amend-
ments to the ICNT/R. The amendments were made to rules gov-
erning marine scientific research within the 200-mile exclusive ec-
onomic zone and on the continental shelf.95 Current rules require
persons conducting research within a coastal State's jurisdiction
to obtain that State's consent.96 Coastal State consent is man-
dated if the research is conducted for peaceful purposes and ful-
fills certain other criteria. 97 A United States' sponsored
amendment gives implied consent to research conducted at speci-
fied distances from the shore. 98 Another amendment states that
the absence of diplomatic relations is insufficient grounds for
areas. A proposal by Argentina, Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, New
Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States and Uruguay
would define submarine oceanic ridges as long, narrow submarine eleva-
tions formed by oceanic crust, and establish that in areas of such ridges,
the outer limit of the continental shelf would not exceed a distance of 350
miles. Bulgaria proposed that the extension of the continental shelf on
the basis of depth and distance would be subject to the shelf not being ex-
tended to submarine oceanic ridges. Japan suggested that ridges formed
of oceanic crust should be excluded from the definition of the continental
margin as well as the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof.
Singapore proposed the deletion of the combined depth-distance crite-
ria, so that only the 350-mile outer limit would apply.
SEA/375, supra note 66, at 12.
The ICNT/R contains a technical formula which limits a state's extension of its
continental shelf along a submarine ridge. However, a state could easily misapply
the formula to obtain jurisdiction over large areas of mid-oceanic ridges. These
ridges are considered part of the deep seabed. U.S. Delegation Report, New York,
supra note 70, at 32. See also ICNT/R, supra note 16, art. 76.
94. U.S. Delegation Report, New York, supra note 70, at 33. See also SEA/375,
supra note 66, at 13.
95. U.S. Delegation Report, New York, supra note 70, at 39.
96. ICNT/R, supra note 16, arts. 245-246, para. 2.
97. The other criteria are vague. The ICNT/R states that coastal States must,
"in normal circumstances," consent to research conducted "exclusively for peace-
ful purposes and in order to increase scientific knowledge of the marine environ-
ment for the benefit of all mankind." ICNT/R, supra note 16, art. 246, para. 3.
Due to the undeniable importance and peaceful nature of climatic research, ac-
tivities of the World Meteorlogical Organization have been considered peaceful re-
search for the benefit of all mankind. U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/80 (1979). Resolution 16
(Cg-VIII), adopted by the World Meteorological Organization at its eighth con-
gress held in Geneva in April/May, 1979. For a discussion of arguments favoring
exemption of climatic research from international restrictions on scientific re-
search, see Nierenberg, Don't Let Politics Prescribe Climatic Research, CERES
Nov.-Dec. 1978, at 23.
98. The proposed new article gives implied consent to research conducted on
the continental shelf beyond 200 miles from shore. However, "implied consent"
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withholding consent.9 9 Other amendments limit the right of a
coastal State to censor publication of research results00 and
weaken the obligation of coastal States to provide harbor access
to research ships.10l
The Group of Legal Experts on Final Clauses produced texts on
signature, ratification, and accession to the Convention.102 The
Group agreed to permit reservations to the Convention, but did
not agree on the extent to which they would be allowed.10 3 Pro-
posals on the number of States Parties required for the Conven-
tion's entry into force ranged from thirty-six to seventy.10 4 The
group did agree that the Convention should enter into force as a
whole and not piecemeal. 0 5 No agreement emerged as to what
relation the Convention would have to existing conventions.106
The group also decided to establish a Preparatory Commission
would not apply to the specific situations in which a coastal State has discretion-
ary power to withhold consent. SEA/375, supra note 66, at 17.
The ICNT/R grants coastal States discretion to withhold consent when the re-
search directly relates to exploitation of natural resources, involves drilling into
the continental shelf or using explosives, or entails building or using artificial is-
lands or structures. ICNT/R, supra note 16, art. 246, para. 4.
99. The ICNT/R states that a state shall grant consent "in normal circum-
stances." See note 100 infra.
The change states that the absence of diplomatic relations between a coastal
State and a researching State is not a prima facie showing that normal circum-
stances do not exist. SEA/375, supra note 66, at 17. See also U.S. Delegation Re-
port, New York, supra note 70, at 40.
100. The ICNT/R permits the coastal States to censor research results. ICNT/
R, supra note 16, art. 249, para. l(e).
The change permits censorship only when the research is of direct significance
to the exploitation of the coastal State's continental shelf. U.S. Delegation Report,
New York, supra note 70, at 41.
101. Id. at 41.
102. The group was established during the session to begin drafting the 'imal
clauses" of the Convention. Final clauses are "a set of provisions found in most
multilateral treaties that deal with various questions concerning the status of the
instrument." SEA/375, supra note 66, at 19.
The group divided the final clauses into two groups--controversial and noncon-
troversial. The controversial clauses relate to: (1) amendment or revision, (2) res-
ervations, (3) relation to other conventions, (4) entry into force, (5) transitional
provisions, (6) denunciation, and (7) participation in the convention. The non-
controversial clauses are: (1) signature, (2) ratification, (3) status of annexes, (4)
authentic texts, (5) depository, and (6) the testimonium clause. U.S. Delegation
Report, New York, supra note 70, at 46.
103. Id. at 47. For a discussion of the policies for and against permitting reser-
vations to a convention, and other "final clauses" issues, see F. KIRGIS, INTERNA-
TIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEm LEGAL SETTING 76-110 (1977).
104. U.S. Delegation Report, New York, supra note 70, at 48.
105. Id.
106. The specific issues discussed were:
that would draft proposed rules and regulations for the future Au-
thority. 0
7
DEVELOPMENTS BEYOND THE CONFERENCE
Unilateral Deep Seabed Mining Legislation
At least two western industrialized nations are considering sea-
bed mining legislation: the United States and the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is
considering legislation designed to give domestic investors secur-
* ity in making the huge investments necessary to begin deep sea-
bed exploitation.108 However, the FRG legislation has been
opposed by several factions within the country that believe such
legislation is either improper or impractical.109
In the United States, unilateral deep seabed mining legislation
has been introduced in every congressional session since 1972.110
Comprehensive legislation sanctioning exploitation of the deep
seabed by United States citizens was again introduced in the 96th
session of the United States Congress."' The Carter administra-
tion now supports such legislation, partially because of the belief
that it enhances the United States bargaining position at UN-
CLOS I and places pressure on the Conference to reach an early
conclusion."l2 Three versions of the legislation are before Con-
(1) The extent to which the 1958 Law of the Sea Conventions will be su-
perseded by the new treaty;
(2) the effect of the new treaty on other U.N. sponsored treaties dealing
with related subjects; and
(3) the effect of the treaty upon bilateral agreements on related subjects.
No agreement was reached. Id.
107. Id.
108. Duesseldorf Wirtshaftswoche (German), March 19, 1979, at 18-20, trans-
lated and reprinted in 98 U.S. JoiNT PUBiCAnONS RESEARCH SERVICE-TRANSLA-
TIONS ON LAw OF THE SEA 61 (1979).
109. Some Socialists in Germany have opposed the legislation for the reasons
that are often voiced by the G-77. Id. Some FRG officials and experts feel unilat-
eral legislation may be a bad investment because ocean mineral reserves may not
be as bountiful as some estimates indicate. Id. (statement of Ranz F. Diederich
and statement of Ederhard Mueller, managing director of "Syndicate for Raw
Materials Exploitable by Sea Technology").
110. Kitos, A Report on Legislation: The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources
Act, 10 LAw. AMERICAS 963 (1978).
111. In the Senate, S-493 was introduced early in the 96th session. S. 493, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (hereinafter referred to as S. 493). In the House of Repre-
sentatives, two bills were introduced, H.. 2759, by Mr. Murphy (of New York) and
Mr. Breaux, and M.R. 3268, by Mr. Wilson (of California). H.R. 2759 and H.R. 3268,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (hereinafter referred to as H.R. 2759 and H.R. 3268).
112. Both the Nixon and Ford administrations opposed the enactment of sea-
bed mining legislation on the premise that such action would have a negative im-
pact on the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference.
President Carter appointed Elliott L. Richardson as the United States Ambassa-
dor to UNCLOS III and, during the first several months of the new administration,
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gress. They are substantially the same and each represents a
complete piece of legislation.1' 3 Controversy over a few specific
provisions and the slow pace with which the legislation moved
through committees 1 4 made it impossible for the bills to be
finally acted upon before the end of the 96th session.
1 15
The bill that made the most progress in the House of Repre-
sentatives during the 96th Congress, H.R. 2759, is termed the Deep
Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act.11 6 The Senate Bill, S. 493,
a review of the United States position on the international negotiations and do-
mestic legislation was undertaken.
Pending that review and an assessment of the work of the impending sixth ses-
sion of UNCLOS Il, Ambassador Richardson testified before numerous congres-
sional committees in the spring of 1977 that the administration did not support
legislation at that time. Prompted, in part, by serious violations of procedural due
process at the sixth session, the Ambassador announced later that fall that the ad-
ministration now advocated congressional mining legislation. Testifying before
joint hearings held by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Trans-
portation and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Richardson noted
that legislation would be needed whether there was a treaty or not.
113. See S. 493, H.R. 2759, and H.R. 3268, supra note 111.
114. S. 493 was referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, and the Committee on
Foreign Relations. Both H.P. 2759 and H.R. 3268 were referred to the Committee
on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, the Committee
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, and the Ways and Means Committee.
115. The House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs did not report
on H.R. 2759 and H.R. 3268 during 1979. Therefore, it never reached the floor for a
vote. S. 493 was amended and passed by voice vote on the Senate floor December
15, 1979.
116. HR. 2759 was introduced on March 8, 1979, by Mr. Murphy (of New York),
Mr. Breaux, Mr. Udall, Mr. Santini, Mr. Zablocki, Mr. Bingham, Mr. Bonker, Mr.
Ullman, Mr. Pritchard, Mr. Young (of Alaska), Mr. DerWinski, and Ms. Conable.
The bill was referred to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, and
the Ways and Means Committee. Additional members joined as co-sponsors sub-
sequent to the bill's original introduction.
The bill was referred on March 14, 1979, to the Committee on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries' Subcommittee on Oceanography, which held hearings on May 22,
May 23, and June 7, 1979. Testimony was received from members of Congress, offi-
cials of the executive branch, representatives of the mining industry, environmen-
tal groups, church groups, academia, a maritime organization, and other interested
citizens.
H.R. 2759 as introduced was identical to the language of H.R. 3350 as it passed
the House during the 95th Congress, except for deletion of the definition of the
term "secretary." Many amendments were subsequently made in committee.
Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act Hearings and Markup on H.R. 2759
Before the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 411
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 2759 on August 17, 1979].
In the 95th Congress, the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs ordered H.R.
3350, as amended, reported to the House of Representatives on October 26, 1977.
however, is currently more consistent with the Carter administra-
tion's views with respect to the legislation.117 This legislation
would establish a comprehensive interim program to encourage
and regulate development of deep seabed hard mineral resources
until implementation of a superseding international agreement.118
Opponents of the legislation argue that unilateral action in the
deep seabed would violate international law.119
On July 26, 1978, the House passed H.R. 3350, as amended, by a vote of 312 yeas, 80
nays. The Senate did not act on the legislation.
The Subcommittee on Mines and Mining in this Congress held two days of hear-
ings, on May 1 and 2, 1979. The Subcommittee ordered H.R. 2759, as amended, re-
ported to the Full Committee on June 21, 1979. On July 18, 1979, the Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs, by voice vote, ordered the bill, as amended, reported
to the House of Representatives with a recommendation that it be approved.
On August 2, 1979, the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs made similar
recommendations.
The Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, after hearings on August 17,
1979, also ordered H.R. 2759, as amended, reported to the House of Representatives
with a recommendation that it be approved.
The Subcommittee on International Organizations and the Subcommittee on In-
ternational Economic Policy and Trade of the House Committee on International
Relations held hearings on H.R. 2759 in November.
117. Although H.R. 2759 has been through extensive refinement and revision in
the House hearing process, the Carter administration has had a much greater op-
portunity to work with the Senate seabed mining bill S. 493. The bill introduced in
the Senate reflects many changes requested by the administration. Letter from
Juanita M. Kreps, Secretary of Commerce, and Cecil D. Andrus, Secretary of the
Interior, to the Chairman, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, (June 5,
1979), reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 2759 on August 17, 1979, supra note 116, at 69.
S. 493 was amended December 15, 1979, just prior to passing the Senate.
118. H.R. 2759, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2 (purposes and findings), 3 (interna-
tional objectives) (1979).
Section 2(b) states the purposes of the act as follows:
(b) Purposes.-The Congress declares that the purposes of this Act
are-
(1) to encourage the successful conclusion of a comprehensive Law of
the Sea Treaty, which will give legal definition to the principle that the
hard mineral resources of the deep seabed are the common heritage of
mankind and which will assure, among other things, nondiscriminatory
access to such resources for all nations;
(2) pending the entering into force of such a Treaty, to provide for the
establishment of an international revenue sharing fund, the proceeds of
which shall be used for sharing with the international community pursu-
ant to such Treaty;
(3) to establish, pending the ratification by, and entering into force
with respect to, the United States of such a Treaty, an interim program to
regulate the exploration for and commercial recovery of hard mineral re-
sources of the deep seabed by United States citizens;
(4) to accelerate the program of environmental assessment of explora-
tion for and commercial recovery of hard mineral resources of the deep
seabed and assure that such exploration and recovery activities are con-
ducted in a manner which will encourage the conservation of such re-
sources, protect the quality of the environment, and promote the safety of
life and property at sea; and
(5) to encourage the continued development of technology necessary
to recover the hard mineral resources of the deep seabed.
119. Developing countries have argued that United Nations General Assembly
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The Carter administration maintains that United Nations reso-
lutions involving the "Common Heritage" concept have never be-
come binding international law.120 Rather, as a system which
allocates access among United States citizens and reciprocating
States, the legislation is consistent with the 1958 Convention On
The High Seas as an exercise of the freedom of the high seas that
does not unreasonably interfere with other internationally recog-
nized freedoms of the high seas. 2 1 The bill sets up a revenue-
sharing fund for developing nations that would be taken over by
the International Seabed Authority if a Law of the Sea Conven-
tion is adopted.1
22
The legislation has created controversy over international and
domestic matters. International concerns include the status of
the United States sanctioned miners under a Law of the Sea Con-
Resolution 2749 (XXV), which espouses the doctrine that the ocean resources be-
yond the jurisdiction of any nation belong to the "common heritage of mankind,"
binds the United States or any other advanced industrial country against proceed-
ing with deep ocean mining on a unilateral basis. See note 48 supra for further
discussion of the "common heritage" concept.
120. It has been Ambassador Richardson's position at UNCLOS 1I that Resolu-
tion 2749 (XXV) is not binding on any nation at the present time in the absence of
a treaty giving legal definition to the "common heritage" concept.
In 1969, a General Assembly resolution calling for a moratorium on deep seabed
exploitation was adopted. The United States opposed this moratorium and made
it clear that such resolutions are only recommendations and are not legally bind-
ing.
In 1967 Ambassador Arvid Pardo, representing the permanent mission of Malta
to the United Nations, submitted a proposal urging that resources on the ocean
floor be regarded as the "common heritage of mankind" and be used for the bene-
fit of mankind, particularly developing nations. The United States supported the
General Assembly resolution to this effect, although "common heritage" was left
undefined. See note 48 supra for a further discussion.
A result of the Malta proposal was the adoption, in 1970, of a resolution by the
United Nations to create the Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the
Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction (also
known as the Seabeds Committee). Hearings on H.R. 2759 on August 17, 1979,
supra note 118, at 43.
121. Id.
122. Under Title IV of HR. 2759, a tax would be imposed on removal of a hard
mineral resource from the deep seabed. The amount of the tax would be 3.75 per-
cent of the imputed value of the removed resource. For purposes of this title, im-
puted value means twenty percent of the fair market value of the commercially
recoverable metals and minerals. The tax revenue would be placed in a "Deep
Seabed Revenue Sharing Trust Fund" to be shared among nations if an interna-
tional seabed treaty is in effect with respect to the United States. If such a treaty
were not in effect, the revenue would be available for such purposes as Congress
provides. Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act: Hearings on H.R. 2759 Before
the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 411 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on HR. 2759 on August 2, 1979].
vention,123 and whether all vessels involved in mining under the
statute will be required to be documented in the United States.
24
Domestic concerns include: 1) how the Seabed Mining Agency
will interact with other agencies in terms of environmental pro-
tection and enforcement of the regulations; 2) what administra-
tive and review procedures will be adopted; and 3) what role the
public should have in setting marine mining policy. 25
The unilateral legislation being considered by western industri-
alized nations has been characterized by many nations as illegal,
immoral, and threatening to the UNCLOS I negotiations.1 26 The
United States Congress is aware of the effect its legislation may
have on UNCLOS HI.127 Because of the current plan to conclude
UNCLOS III in 1980, unilateral legislation has been criticized as
123. Title II of H.R. 2759 contains two sections providing for transition to an in-
ternational agreement. The administration supports language which would em-
phasize that companies should be allowed to continue their operations under a
Law of the Sea Treaty, while recognizing that the treaty may impose different obli-
gations than those imposed by United States domestic legislation. The Adminis-
tration strongly believes that such language must not imply an obligation by the
United States government to compensate mining firms. Therefore, a third section,
titled Disclaimer of Obligation to Pay Compensation, is proposed. Hearings on
H.R. 2759 on August 17, 1979, supra note 118, at 90. See also id. at 70-104 (Carter
administration's views on proposed amendments). The lack of a "guarantee
clause" may deter investment, making the legislation ineffective.
124. Hearings on H.R. 2759 on August 17, 1979, supra note 118, at 71. For more
detailed discussion exclusively on this issue, see the Testimony of Ambassador
Richardson before the International Organizations and the International Eco-
nomic Policy and Trade Subcommittees of the House International Relations
Committee (Nov. 1, 1979).
125. Id. at 72-74.
126. The following statement of the Group of 77 typifies this view:
The Group of 77 cannot accept that any rights may be acquired by any
State, person or entity by virtue of such unilateral measures. Those who
through their own actions would create a situation which impels them to
seek recognition of such rights at this Conference must clearly know from
now that they will be creating an additional obstacle to the conclusion of a
treaty. The Group cannot be expected to alter its long-standing and well-
stated position rejecting the recognition of acquired rights. We cannot be
expected to give a cloak of legality to what is illegal ab initio.
Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea The Seventh
Session, 73 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 1, 20 (1979).
In direct response to similar charges, Elliot Richardson, the United States repre-
sentative, state&
Far from jeopardizing the Conference, seabed mining legislation should
facilitate the early conclusion of a generally acceptable Law of the Sea
Treaty by dispelling any impression that the governments of the countries
preparing to engage in such mining can be induced to acquiesce in an
otherwise unacceptable treaty because that is the only way to obtain the
minerals.
127. Since January 1, 1979, S. 493 has required the Secretary of State to make
reports to Congress as to UNCLOS HI progress, and asks that he recommend any
amendments that might assist in concluding the negotiations. S. 493, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. at 9 (1979).
[VOL. 17: 691, 19801 Synopsis
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
pointless, costly, and risky.128 However, the criticism has
prompted neither premature passage nor abandonment of the leg-
islation. The Carter administration asserts that many of the rea-
sons for the legislation are valid even in light of the recent
UNCLOS HI announcement of the Conference's 1980 conclu-
sion.- 9 Therefore, although it is unlikely that marine mining leg-
128. In dissent, Congressman Paul N. McCloskey, Jr., stated:
I dissent from passage of this bill at this time, believing that such action
may inhibit the successful conclusion of the Law of the Sea negotiations,
expected to result in finalization of treaty language in 1980.
This bill would mark the first time a nation has sought to unilaterally
control operations on the high seas to mine the resources of the deep sea-
bed to the exclusion of other nations. For nine years we have urged the
other nations of the world to forego precisely the action this bill autho-
rizes pending conclusion of a Law of the Sea treaty. If such a treaty were
not now possible, it would be understandable, if, in frustration and impa-
tience, we enacted legislation claiming that we were thereby reducing the
Common Heritage of Mankind into an asset usable by mankind.
With the successful progress of the negotiations at the present time, it
seems highly likely we will have a treaty within a year. If not, a year's de-
lay to find out can scarcely hurt the future efforts of U.S. and foreign min-
ing companies. If, however, the price and anger of the other parties in the
Law of the Sea negotiations is such that the negotiations themselves
break down, our legislation will certainly be blamed as the reason.
Hearings on H.R. 2759 on August 17, 1979, supra note 118, at 105.
129. Ambassador Richardson has voiced the administration's view as follows:
Mr. Chairman, I have testified many times and would like to reiterate
that the United States would prefer deep seabed mining to take place
under a negotiated multilateral regime. However, despite the progress we
have made at the Law of the Sea Conference toward such a regime, it is
clear that we cannot yet be certain that a generally acceptable convention
will result. In any event, an acceptable treaty governing seabed mining
could not enter into force for some years. Therefore, the Administration
still believes that the early enactment of well thought out domestic legis-
lation establishing an interim statutory framework within which the or-
derly development of seabed resources can proceed, is in the interest both
of the United States and of the world community. We take this position
mindful of the important role played in our economic well-being and our
national defense by adequate supplies of cobalt, manganese, nickel, and
copper. We believe that deep seabed mining of these minerals will reduce
United States vulnerability to dangerous and costly interruptions of sup-
ply of these four metals.
Elliot L. Richardson, testimony before the Subcommittee on Oceanography, Com-
mittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, U.S. House of Representatives (May 22,
1979).
Further, there are a number of reasons why an international Law of the Sea
Convention may not become binding on the United States. The Law of the Sea
delegates could determine that successful negotiations are not possible at this
time and the Conference might disband. It is also possible that a "successfully ne-
gotiated" treaty may enter into force with respect to many nations, but not the
United States, because we choose not to ratify it.
If this situation obtains, it is imperative that a seabed mining regime be estab-
lished by domestic legislation. First, for the reasons noted above with respect to a
islation will be passed this year, efforts to pass such legislation
will continue in the 97th Congress.
Disputes and Agreements Concerning the Continental Shelf and
Maritime Boundaries
During the past year, a number of countries reached agreement
or attempted agreement on continental shell and maritime
boundary disputes. On December 1, 1978, Tunisia and Libya in-
formed the International Court of Justice of their desire for the
Court's assistance in delimiting their continental shelf.130 Austra-
lia and Papua New Guinea signed a treaty on sovereignty and
maritime boundaries on December 18, 1978.131 Australia and Indo-
nesia held talks in February 1979 in an attempt to agree on bound-
aries east and west of East Timor.l32 On March 3, 1979, Thailand,
India, and Indonesia agreed on delineation of their boundaries in
the Andaman Sea. 3 3 These three countries determined a tri-
junction point and delimited their continental shelves.134 Argen-
tina and Chile agreed to accept papal mediation in their dispute
involving the Beagle Channel region.135 Japan and South Korea
security of supply of ocean minerals and the need for further technological devel-
opment, a domestic program to authorize the commercial recovery of manganese
nodules and to protect the marine environment must be established. Hearings on
H.R. 2759 on August 17, 1979, supra note 118, at 41.
For an in-depth analysis of the economic ramifications of deep seabed mining on
the United States, including projections for the four seabed minerals, see UnTED
STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, OFFICE OF OCEAN, RESOURCE AND POLICY COORDINA-
TION, COBALT, COPPER, NICKEL, AND MANGANESE: FUTURE SUPPLY AND DEMAND IM-
PUCATIONS FOR DEEP SEABED MINING (1979).
130. Tunisia and Libya asked the Court to provide them with current rules and
principles of international law applicable to delimitation, and a practical way to
apply them in their particular situation. 18 INT'L LEGAL MAmTERALS 49 (1979).
131. Among the issues resolved were: (1) the establishment of sea boundaries
between the islands of Dauan, Kaumag, Siabai, and Papua New Guinea; (2) recog-
nition of each other's sovereignty over numerous other islands; (3) the establish-
ment of a "protected zone" in the Torres Strait; and (4) other provisions related to
exploitation and protection of seabed resources and fishing. 18 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 291 (1979). The agreement also banned mining and oil drilling for ten
years. Pacific Islands Monthly, Feb., 1979, at 13.
132. The talks were nonproductive. The existing boundaries between Indonesia
and Australia, east and west of East Timor, were agreed to during bargaining ses-
sions in 1971-1972. Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Dr. Mochta, claims that Australia
"took Indonesia to the cleaners in that agreement." There are very rich oil and gas
deposits at stake in the disputed area. The Sydney Morning Hearld, Dec. 22, 1978,
at 7, reprinted in 91 U.S. JOINT PUBLIcATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE-TRANsLATIONs
ON LAw OF THE SEA 39 (1979).
133. Beijing Radio, XINHUA, broadcast at 1237 GMT, Mar. 3, 1979, translated
and reprinted in 98 U.S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVIcE-TRANSLATIONS
ON LAw OF THE SEA 29 (1979).
134. Id.
135. 18 IN'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1 (1979). The dispute over three small islands in
the Beagle Channel is over 100 years old. The two countries submitted the dispute
to an international arbitration panel in 1971. In 1977, Great Britain announced the
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moved closer toward implementing their 1974 binational continen-
tal shelf agreement. The 1974 agreement provides for the joint de-
velopment of the continental shelf lying between the two
countries.13 6 The United States and Canada agreed to submit de-
limitation of their maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine to the
International Court of Justice. 3 7 United States President Carter
transmitted three treaties to the United States Senate for ratifica-
tion on January 23, 1979.138 The treaties establish maritime
panel's decision that the islands belonged to Chile. Argentina rejected the deci-
sion. See Synopsis, Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea 1977-1978, 16 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 705, 732 (1978).
As part of the mediation agreement, Chile and Argentina also agreed not to re-
sort to the use of military force, to reduce military forces in the area to pre-1977
levels, and to avoid adopting measures that might increase tension in the area. 18
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1 (1979).
Papal mediation may not resolve the dispute. Chile claims it will not be bound
by any decisions because the Holy See is a mediator, not an arbitrator. Chile
reserves the right to enforce the prior arbitration decision through the Intema-
tional Court at the Hague. Paris radio, AFP, broadcast at 1503 GMT, Jan. 9, 1979,
translated and reprinted in 91 U.S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE-
TRANSLATIONS ON LAW OF THE SEA 64 (1979).
The Argentine Foreign Ministry submitted a document to the Holy See which
stated that "Argentina would recognize Chile's sovereignty over the three dis-
puted islands-Lennos, Picton, and Nueva-and twelve miles of territorial waters
in exchange for a shared exploitation of the disputed waters." 0 Globo (Rio de
Janeiro), Dec. 27, 1978, at 14, translated and reprinted in 91 U.S. Jonr PUBLICA-
TIONS RESEARCH SERvIcE-TRANsLATIONS ON LAW OF THE SEA 60 (1979).
For a detailed history of the Beagle Channel dispute, see Comment, The Beagle
Channel Affair, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 733, 733-740 (1977).
136. The disputed region of the continental shelf is suspected to have rich de-
posits of oil. The Korea Times, Jan. 10, 1979, at 3, tranlated and reprinted in 91
U.S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE-TRANSLATIONS ON LAW OF THE SEA 31
(1979).
On March 7, 1979, the two countries agreed on a method of selecting concession-
aires. The concessionaires will in turn select the operators who will do the drilling
for oil. Seoul radio, HAPTONG, broadcast at 0819 GMT, Mar. 8, 1979, translated
and reprinted in 93 U.S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE-TRANSLATIONS
ON LAw OF THE SEA 37 (1979).
137. President Carter transmitted the "Maritime Boundary Settlement Treaty
With Canada" to the Senate on May 3, 1979, for ratification. The boundary dispute
arose in 1977 after both countries had extended their respective fisheries jurisdic-
tions to 200 nautical miles. President's Message to Congress Transmitting the
Maritime Boundary Settlement Treaty With Canada and the Agreement on East
Coast Fishery Resources With Canada, 15 WEEKLY CoMP. OF PRES. Doc. 776 (May
3, 1979).
For a detailed discussion of the boundary dispute in the Gulf of Maine, see
Comment, Boundary Delimitation in the Economic Zone, 30 MAINE L REV. 207,
207-245 (1979).
138. President's Message to Congress Transmitting Three Treaties Establishing
Maritime Boundaries Between the United States and Mexico, Venezuela, and
Cuba, 15 WEEKLY CONF. OF PREs. Doc. 86 (Jan. 23, 1979).
boundaries between the United States and Mexico, Venezuela,
and Cuba.139
Extensions of Sovereignty Over Fishing and Territorial Waters
States have continued to declare sovereignty over waters ex-
tending 200 miles from their shores.140 Kenya extended its eco-
nomic zone 200 miles seaward 14 1 and reserved the right to license
and control fishing and mineral exploitation in the zone.14 2 Indo-
nesia's Secretary of the Directorate General of Fisheries an-
nounced on April 4, 1979, that Indonesia would proclaim an
exclusive economic zone extending as much as 200 miles from its
existing territorial water zone. 14 3 Korea may establish a 200-mile
zone, 144 and Australia was expected to announce a 200-mile zone
sometime during 1979.145 Norway postponed plans to announce a
200-mile zone around Jan Mayen.146 Yugoslavia announced the
extension of its territorial waters from ten miles to twelve
139. The treaties were prompted by each country's previous establishment of
200-mile zones. Each treaty states that its sole purpose is to establish maritime
boundaries in areas where the 200-mile zones overlap. Each treaty also specifi-
cally disclaims any effect on any country's claims as to the breadth of its tenitorial
waters, or the nature of its jurisdiction in the 200-mile zone. Id.
140. So far, over 76 countries have declared 200-mile fishing zones. The exten-
sions have had considerable impact on the world fishing industry, since only about
one percent of the total world catch of fish occurs beyond 200 miles from shore.
For a detailed discussion of the impact on developing countries and major fishing
countries see Gulland, Developing Countries and the New Law of the Sea, OCEA-
NUS, Spring, 1979, at 36.
141. The Nairobi Daily Nation, Mar. 6, 1979, at 6, translated and reprinted in 97
U.S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE-TRNxsLAToNS ON LAW OF THE SEA 38
(1979).
142. Id.
143. Komas (Jakarta), Apr. 6, 1979, at 2, translated and reprinted in 97 U.S.
JOINT PUBLCATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE-TRANSLATIONS ON LAW OF THE SEA 21
(1979).
144. South Korea stated that it would consider establishing a 200-mile zone in
the event that Japan declared a similar zone. Seoul radio, HAPTONG, Broadcast
at 0055 GMT, Mar. 27, 1979, translated and reprinted in 95 U.S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS
RESEARCH SERvIcE-TRANSLATIONS ON LAv OF THE SEA 17 (1979).
145. Australia has continued to delay formal announcement of a 200-mile fish-
ing zone because of the numerous problems associated with it. Among the
problems are: the lack of a regional policy on migratory tuna, the overlapping of
the zone with those of neighboring countries, the unresolved question of sea
boundaries with respect to Australia's Antarctic Territory, and questions on how
the zone will be policed. The Sydney Morning Herald, Mar. 19, 1979, at 6, reprinted
in 96 U.S. JOINT PUBLCATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE-TRANSLATIONS ON LAW OF THE
SEA 28 (1979).
146. Arbeiderbladet (Oslo), Dec. 14, 1978, at 6, translated and reprinted in 91
U.S. JOINT PUBUCATIONS RESEARCH SERvIcE-TRANsLATIONs ON LAw OF THE SEA
100. Norway has decided to cooperate with Iceland in studying the fishing re-
sources around Jan Mayen. Iceland may have rights to ocean bed resources de-
pending upon final decisions reached at the UNCLOS. Morgenbladid (Reykjavik),
Dec. 23, 1978, at 25, translated and reprinted in 91 U.S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RE-
SEARCH SERviCE-TRANsLATIoNs ON LAW OF THE SEA 90 (1979).
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miles,147 and the Netherlands continued to delay a decision to ex-
tend its territorial waters to twelve miles.148
Fisheries Disputes
Canada,1 49 Costa Rica,150 Mexico,' 5 ' and Peru 5 2 seized United
States tuna boats in 1979. The boats were seized while fishing in
each country's 200-mile zone. While the United States has also
147. Belgrade radio, TANJUG, broadcast at 1736 GMT, Mar. 14, 1979, translated
and reprinted in 94 U.S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE-TRANSLATIONS
ON LAW OF THE SEA 21 (1979).
148. The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not want to declare a
twelve-mile territorial sea. The Ministry is reluctant because it feels that any deci-
sion would be premature until the International Conference on Maritime Law is
concluded. However, the Netherlands has adopted a 200-mile exclusive economic
zone. NRC Handelsblad (Rotterdam), Feb. 14, 1979, at 7, translated and reprinted
in 94 U.S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE-TRANSLATIONS ON LAW OF THE
SEA 53 (1979).
149. Canada seized nineteen United States tuna boats in late August, 1979. Ca-
nada claimed the boats were fishing inside Canada's 200-mile zone. The tuna boat
captains were released after the United States government paid their bail. They
will face trial in Canadian Court in November, 1979. Negotiations between the
United States and Canada broke off on September 12, 1979. No agreement was
reached. Talks will resume in early 1980. L.A. Times, Sept. 23, 1979, pt. II, at 4, col
1.
The United States does not recognize Canada's 200-mile limit as applying to
migratory fish such as tuna. See note 23 infra. Because of this, the United States
government provides tuna boat owners with seizure insurance. This practice has
led one British Columbia official to demand jail sentences for the arrested cap-
tains. M2c.LEANs, Sept. 10, 1979, at 26.
There is no sense of urgency on the part of the United States to resolve the dis-
pute. The tuna have fled Canadian waters for warmer parts. Additionally, the
tuna rarely stray into cold Canadian waters. Therefore it is unlikely that there will
be any further boat seizures in the near future. The Canadians have indicated
that they may be willing to trade the United States tuna fishing rights in return for
United States abandonment of plans for a large herring industry on the west coast.
Canadian fishermen enjoy a lucrative herring trade with Japan. N.Y. Times, Sept.
16, 1979, § A, at 12, col 1.
150. Costa Rica seized three United States tuna boats on January 18, 1979.
Costa Rica claimed the boats were fishing 140 miles off Punta Leona, in Costa
Rica's 200-mile zone. The United States government paid the fines and the boats
were released. San Jose radio, RELOJ, broadcast at 1730 GMT, Jan. 18, 1979, trans-
lated and reprinted in 93 U.S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE-TRANSLA-
TIONS ON LAW OF THE SEA 10 (1979).
151. Mexico seized two United States tuna boats on April 7, 1979, off La Paz.
Madrid radio, EFE, broadcast at 0033 GMT, Apr. 8, 1979, translated and reprinted
in 96 U.S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERvICE-TRANSLATIONS ON LAW OF THE
SEA 22 (1979).
152. Paris Radio, AFP, broadcast at 1323 GMT, May 7, 1979, translated and re-
printed in 98 U.S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE-TRANSLATIONS ON LAW
OF THE SEA 3 (1979).
declared a 200-mile zone, it refuses to recognize the right to con-
trol tuna fishing within such zones.153 The United States re-
sponded to the seizures by placing embargos on tuna and tuna
products from Costa Rica,154 Peru,155 and Canada.
156
There are three possible solutions to the tuna dispute. One is
to establish a new commission to replace the foundering Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATrC).157 Another solu-
tion would be for United States companies to purchase licenses
from each country along the tuna migration route. This would
probably be impractical and prohibitively expensive. A third so-
lution, proposed by the United States, is the issuance of an an-
nual international tuna fishing license, with a fee based on a
ship's net tonnage.158 Costa Rica' 5 9 and Canada160 have rejected
the international license proposal.
On February 14, 1979, the United States and Canada announced
partial settlement of a fishing dispute which had led each country
to ban the other's fishermen from its waters in 1978.161 The dis-
pute arose after both countries extended their fishing limits to 200
miles from 12 miles in 1977.162 The settlement established a man-
agement program for twenty-eight fish stocks in the Georges
Banks region.163 Each country will receive a share of each of the
153. Under United States law, the 200-mile zone does not apply to highly
migratory fish such as tuna. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1825(d) (s) (West Supp. 1979). The
United States rationale is that a country should not be allowed to control
migratory fish just because they happen to swim within 200 miles of its coast. Ja-
pan seems to be the only other country that shares this view. L.A. Times, Sept. 23,
1979, pt. III, at 4, col. 1. As a result, Japan has also shared the seizures. Costa Rica
seized at least one Japanese tuna boat this year. L.A. Times, Feb. 25, 1979, pt. I, at
1, col. 2.
154. The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 permits the Secre-
tary of State to direct the Secretary of the Treasury to prohibit the importation of
fish and fish products from any country which seizes United States fishing boats
under a claim of jurisdiction that is not recognized by the United States. 16
U.S.C.A. § 1825(a) (4) (West Supp. 1979).
On February 16, 1979, the United States placed an embargo on all tuna and tuna
products imports from Costa Rica. The embargo was imposed after Costa Rica
seized the United States fishing boats Uncle Louis and Seafox, on January 18, 1979.
44 Fed. Reg. 1071 (1979).
155. Id. at 2554.
156. Id. at 53118.
157. The Mexican and Costa Rican seizures are probably a result of their with-
drawal from the IATrC. The IATrC establishes tuna quotas for each member
country, in lieu of member country licensing. Dissatisfaction with their quota al-
lotment led Costa Rica and Mexico to withdraw from the IATTC. LA Times, Feb.
1, 1979, pt. I, at 1, col. 1.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1979, § A, at 12, col. 1.
161. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1979, § A, at 25, col. 1.
162. Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 1979, at 16, col 4.
163. Id.
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twenty-eight stocks. 64 The shares will be reviewed every ten
years. 65
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) held its fifth meeting in Manila from May 7 through
June 3, 1979.166 At the meeting, UNCTAD adopted a resolution,
submitted by the G-77, that called for equitable participation in
bulk shipping by the developing countries.167 The resolution also
called for UNCTAD to conduct a program to study ways to help
developing countries enlarge their shipping capacities.168
UNCTAD also adopted a resolution that requested all states to re-
164. Id. Some representative stocks are: Scallops--Canada 73.35%, U.S.
26.65%; Cod--Canada 17%, U.S. 83%; Haddock-Canada 21%, U.S. 79%.
165. Id.
166. U.N. CHRomcLE, July, 1979, at 44.
167. Id.
168. The Conference also urged states to adhere to the 1974 Convention on a
Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences. The 1974 convention was instigated by
UNCTAD's secretariat. It established shipping quotas for goods carried on ships
between two trading partners. Forty percent of each nation's shipments were to
be carried on flag vessels of that nation. The remaining twenty percent could be
carried by third parties. The United States and Great Britain were among the
countries that voted against the Convention. So far, the nations that have ratified
the Convention represent only six percent of world merchant tonnage, and some
of those have attached restrictions. Wall St. J., Apr. 13, 1979, at 6, col. 1.
European Economic Community nations were urged by France, West Germany,
and Belgium to ratify the 1974 Convention; however, Great Britain insisted that
trade between major industrial nations be exempt from the quotas. Two-fifths of
Britain's shipping business is as a carrier between two other trading nations. The
Daily Telegraph (London), Feb. 21, 1979, at 21, col. 5.
The major western shipping nations are apprehensive about the possibility of
widespread acceptance of the Convention with respect to bulk carriers. Greece
might lose from 95% to 97% of its bulk carrier tonnage. Norway could lose 87% of
its bulk carrier tonnage. L.A. Times, May 7, 1979, pt. I, at 12, col. 5.
Current South American practices illustrate problems that extension of the
Convention to bulk shipping might cause. For example, Columbia has an ordi-
nance that requires 50% of its exports and imports to be carried on Columbian
flagships. The ordinance was passed in 1969, but it had little effect until recently,
due to Columbia's limitations in the area of bulk shipping. In April, 1977, a Colum-
bian and a Panamanian shipping firm entered an agreement. The agreement gave
Columbian flag carriers a sizeable, chemical bulk shipping capacity. Major United
States chemical procedures complained about Columbia's practice to the United
States Federal Marine Commission (FMC). The chemical producers allege that
Columbia's shipping ordinance results in ballooning shipping rates, schedules that
prevent the companies from providing their customers with adequate service, and
a refusal by the major carrier to honor claims for losses. The FMC held a prehear-
ing conference on February 6, 1979, to decide what action to take. The FMC chair-
man, Richard Daschbach, reportedly stated that he wanted to strike back at
frain from enacting unilateral legislation permitting the mining of
the deep seabed until UNCLOS I had established an interna-
tional regime for the area.169
Actions Taken by the International Whaling Commission
The International Whaling Commission (IWC) held its 1979
quota meeting in Tokyo in December 19, 1978.170 The Commission
announced the 1979 sperm whale quotas17 ' and banned the catch-
ing of sperm whales in Australian waters. 72 The IWC held its an-
nual Conference on July 9, 1979, in London.173 At the Conference,
the Commission voted to ban all whale hunting for ten years on
the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of
countries engaging in shipping practices detrimental to United States commerce.
Bus. WEEK, Feb. 19, 1979, at 34.
169. The resolution was submitted by Cuba on behalf of the Group of 77. It was
adopted by a roll-call vote of 107-9, with 13 abstentions. The nine countries oppos-
ing the resolution were Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, United Kingdom, and United States. U.N. CHRoNIcLE, July, 1979, at
44, 52.
170. Tokyo radio, KYDO, broadcast at 0055 GMT, Dec. 19, 1978, translated and
reprinted in 91 U.S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE-TRANSLATIONS ON
LAw OF THE SEA 1 (1979).
171. The IWC announced a total 1979 sperm whale quota of 9521. In 1978, 10,046
sperm whales were killed. The IWC also banned the catching of female sperm
whales, and set a quota of 3800 male sperm whales in the North Pacific. The IWC
has previously banned the fishing of blue, humpback, and right whales. The Daily
Telegraph (London), Jan. 2, 1979, at 6, col. 7.
172. Australia initiated the IWC action by banning all whaling in its 200-mile
zone. Australia also prohibited the importation of whale products. Australia's ac-
tions were viewed as a signiflcant step toward whale preservation. Australian gov-
ernment representatives chair the commission and its scientific committee. Japan
and Russia had previously depended on Australia's support in keeping the whal-
ing industry alive. Australia's Prime Minister announced that the "Government
has switched from a policy of 'conservation utilisation to a vigorous and active pol-
icy of protection."' Australia is now expected to join the United States and other
nonwhaling nations in opposing the whaling nations at future IWC meetings. The
Sydney Morning Herald, Apr. 6, 1979, at 6, translated and reprinted in 98 U.S. JOINT
PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERvIcE-TRANSLATIONS ON LAW OF THE SEA 20 (1979).
173. The twenty-three member IWC met for five days. The Christian Sci. Moni-
tor, July 10, 1079, at 10, col. 1 (western ed.). Four countries introduced whaling
moratorium proposals at the Conference. Seychelles, a new IWC member, asked
for a whale sanctuary in the Indian Ocean, and a three-year world ban on killing
sperm whales. Nation (Victoria), Apr. 24, 1979, at 2, reprinted in 98 U.S. JOINT PuB-
LICATIONS RESEARCH SERvicE-TRANsLATIONS ON LAw OF THE SEA 2 (1979). The In-
dian Ocean is a major whale breeding ground. Seychelles is reportedly developing
whale watching as a tourist industry. Wash. Post, July 14, 1979, § A, at 10, col. 1.
Australia proposed an indefinite ban on all whaling. The United States introduced
a similar motion; however, the United States proposal allowed Eskimos to hunt
the bowhead whale under a strict quota system. ThIE, July 9, 1979, at 45. Britain
called for a worldwide ban on whaling and urged members of the European Eco-
nomic Community to embargo the importation of all whale products. The Chris-
tian Sci Monitor, July 10, 1979, at 10, col. 1 (western ed.).
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Oman. 174 The Commission also outlawed the use of giant floating
factory ships to catch and process whales. 175
Argentina Moves to Strengthen Its Antarctic Claims
Argentina took a number of steps during the past year to
strengthen its claims to sovereignty in Antarctica. Argentina's
"1978-1979 Antarctica Campaign" began on November 21, 1978.176
174. The Seychelles moratorium proposal was the only one adopted by the
IWC. Wash. Post, July 14, 1979, § A, at 10, col. 1.
175. The Conference members voted 18-2 to outlaw offshore whale hunting by
factory ships. From now on, IWC members can only pursue whales in boats that
put out from shore when whales are spotted. The ban allowed Japan an exemp-
tion to hunt the Minke whale in a narrow strip of water off Antarctica. The IWC
expects this prohibition to save 8000 whales or 28% of those being caught annu-
ally. NEWSWEEK, July 23, 1979, at 64.
The IWC resolutions will have no effect on pirate whalers. The pirates register
their boats in non-IWC countries (typically Cyprus, Portugal, and Somalia), and
ignore IWC rules. Japan, an IWC member, has bought whale meat from the pi-
rates in the past. Between 1974 and 1978, Japan's whale kill decreased from 126,835
tons to 42,102 tons. During the same period, Japan's imports of whale meat in-
creased from 28,822 tons to 34,006 tons. NEWSWEEx, July 23, 1979, at 64. Japan has
announced that it will discontinue buying whale meat from non-IWC members
when its current contracts expire. Wash. Post, July 14, 1979, § A, at 10, col. 1. The
problem is the IWC's inability to enforce its rules against nonmembers. One solu-
tion may be a bill currently being sponsored by United States Senators Warren
Magnuson and Bob Packwood. The bill would deny fishing rights within the
United States 200-mile fishing zone to any countries ignoring IWC rulings. Two
major whaling countries, Japan and Russia, do extensive fishing in United States
waters. TIME, July 9, 1979, at 45.
For an excellent discussion of most aspects of the whaling issue, see Scarff, The
International Management of Whales, Dolphins and Porpoises: An Interdiscipli-
nary Assessment, 6 ECOLOGY L.Q. 326 (1977).
176. As part of the Antarctic Campaign, the icebreaker, General San Martin,
and the transport, Bahia Aguirre, traveled to Vice Commodore Marambio
Antarctic Base. Marambio is an Argentine logistical and scientific base which is
the communications center for all other Argentine Antarctic bases. Lo Opinion
(Buenos Aires), Dec. 4, 1978, at 8, translated and reprinted in 91 U.S. JOINT PuBLI-
CATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE-TRANSLATIONS ON LAW OF THE SEA 73 (1979). The
General San Martin also stopped to resupply General Belgrano Army Base
Number One on the Filchner Barrier in the Weddell Sea. La Prensa (Buenos
Aires), Jan. 30, 1979, at 4, translated and reprinted in 93 U.S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS
RESEARCH SERVICE-TRANsLATIONS ON LAW OF THE SEA 23 (1979).
Argentina also began building General Belgrano Army Base Number Two to re-
place Belgrano base number one. The original base was built on an ice shelf
which has become unsafe due to numerous crevices. Both bases conduct scientific
research. La Nacion (Buenos Aires), Feb. 17, 1979, at 6, translated and reprinted
in 94 U.S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERvIcE-TRANsLATIONS ON LAW OF THE
SEA 23 (1979).
In addition, Argentina sent three families, including young children, to live on
Esperanza Base in Antarctica for one year. The stated purpose was "making effec-
tive the Argentine sovereignty in deed and not only in words." Esperanza Base
Coincident with the beginning of the campaign, the National Di-
rectorate for the Antarctic, an agency of the Argentine Defense
Ministry, published an "Encyclopedia Atlas for the Argentine
Antarctic."' 7 7 Argentina also announced plans for a new meteoro-
logical station at Vice Commodore Marambia Antarctic Base
1 7 8
and directed the First Commission of Research and Geological
Mining to carry out geological mining research in the Tabarin Pe-
ninsula, located in the northeastern zone of the Argentine
Antarctic. 7 9
SUMMARY
A successful conclusion of a Law of the Sea Convention is in
sight. The eighth session of UNCLOS EII brought developing and
developed countries closer to agreement on a parallel system of
deep seabed mining. Charges on miners have been lowered, mak-
ing mining ventures more attractive to investors, while allowing
the Enterprise to compete on an equal basis. The Conference
reached significant compromise in differences over marine scien-
tific research and powers and functions of the Council. Voting
procedures in the Council, production limitations, and seabed dis-
pute settlement are the most important unresolved issues.
There have also been significant developments outside of UN-
CLOS m. The United States failed to reach a regional agreement
that would establish a regime for tuna fishing in the Western
Hemisphere, and the IWC took actions that may finally end the
killing of whales.
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has a school, nursery and a movie theatre. La Prensa (Buenos Aires), Nov. 17,
1978, at 6, translated and reprinted in 91 U.S. JoINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERV-
ICE-TRANSLATIONS ON LAW OF THE SEA 65 (1979).
177. The atlas is printed on high quality paper and has 129 pages. In its intro-
duction, the atlas describes the sources of Argentine rights in the Antarctic. The
atlas describes in detail all Argentine establishments, their history, location and
contributions to science. La Nacion (Buenos Aires), Nov. 10, 1978, at 11, translated
and reprinted in 90 U.S. JOINT PUB11CATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE-TRANSLATIONS
ON LAw OF THE SEA 68 (1979).
178. There are also future plans for a seismological station and a solar radiation
observatory. Clarin (Buenos Aires), Dec. 4, 1978, at 8, translated and reprinted in
91 U.S. JoInT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE-TRANSLATIONS ON LAW OF THE SEA
73 (1979).
179. La Opinion (Buenos Aires), Dec. 6, 1978, at 7, translated and reprinted in
91 U.S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE-TRANSLATIONS ON LAW OF THE SEA
73 (1979).
